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THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND PRIVATE
FINANCING OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS*
“Public” law need not mean that the public pays; it must mean the
public controls.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent trends in privatization2 of the criminal justice system have
provoked vigorous debate.3 The argument against privatization of
* I would like to thank Suzanne Stone Montgomery, J.D. Washington University, 1999, for
reading several drafts of this Note and providing invaluable comments.
1. Jeffrey Standen, An Economic Perspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 249, 269 (1998).
2. Commentators have offered numerous definitions of “privatization.” Broader definitions
appear to encompass any systematic increase in private sector involvement in a given matter. See, e.g.,
E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 889 (1987) (“‘Privatization’ means
increased governmental reliance on the private sector, rather than on government agencies, to satisfy
the needs of society.”); Lewis D. Solomon, Reflections on the Future of Business Organizations, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 1213, 1214 (1999) (“Privatization can be defined as the act of reducing the role of
government, or that of increasing the role of the private sector, in an activity or in the ownership of
assets.”). Narrower formulations restrict the meaning of privatization to actual transfers of ownership
or control of assets to the private sector. See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Reform or Revolution? Tax-
Exempt Bonds, The Legislative Process, and the Meaning of Tax Reform, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
1165, 1199 n.112 (1989) (“‘Privatization’ refers to the private management and in some cases
ownership of facilities . . . ordinarily owned and operated by a governmental unit.”). In this Note,
“privatization” means a significant increase in either private sector control or influence on processes
and institutions, accompanied by a decrease in the exercise of control by politically or constitutionally
accountable officials.
3. Most commentary on privatization in the criminal justice context has focused on private
prisons. See, e.g., W.J. Michael Cody & Andy D. Bennett, The Privatization of Correctional
Institutions: The Tennessee Experience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1987); Martin E. Gold, The
Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359 (1996); Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of
America’s Prison Privatization Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371 (1997); Savas, supra note 2;
Peter J. Duitsman, Comment, The Private Prison Experiment: A Private Sector Solution to Prison
Overcrowding, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2209 (1998); Joseph E. Field, Note, Making Prisons Private: An
Improper Delegation of a Governmental Power, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 649 (1987); Paul Howard
Morris, Note, The Impact of Constitutional Liability on the Privatization Movement After Richardson
v. McKnight, 52 VAND. L. REV. 489 (1999). For commentary on privatization of policing and criminal
adjudication, see PRIVATIZING THE UNITED STATES JUSTICE SYSTEM: POLICE, ADJUDICATION, AND
CORRECTIONS SERVICES FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR (Gary W. Bowman et al. eds., 1992); David A.
Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999).
Only one scholar has specifically discussed emerging practices that would tend to privatize the
prosecution function. See generally Joseph E. Kennedy, Private Financing of Criminal Prosecutions
and the Differing Protections of Liberty and Equality in the Criminal Justice System, 24 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 665 (1997). Another commentator has proposed a system of private financial incentives
designed to reward prosecutors for behaving properly. See Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good
Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM
L. REV. 851 (1995). A large body of commentary discusses the longstanding institution of private
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prosecutors’ offices has considerable force.4 The American institution of the
public prosecutor reflects a “rejection of the general notion of a privileged
class within society”5 as well as a “deep antipathy toward entrusting large
and important matters to the vagaries and occasional self-interestedness of
uninhibited private initiatives.”6 Submitting prosecuting entities to the control
of private actors and market forces would trade the egalitarian notion that the
victim’s wealth should not determine whether a crime is prosecuted for the
efficiency benefits7 of privatization.
Beginning from the premise that such a trade-off would be undesirable,
this Note considers whether prosecuting offices can operate according to the
egalitarian values implicit in a “public” prosecution system while receiving,
or even relying upon, private financial support.8 This Note argues not only
that public control can coexist with private financing, but that a private
financing system, if properly structured, could advance egalitarian values by
offsetting institutional influences that lead the prosecutor to distribute
criminal justice resources inequitably. Accordingly, this Note proposes how
private financing models could be structured to preserve public control and
promote equitable allocation of criminal justice resources.9
prosecution, in which an alleged victim, or a friend or relative of the victim, retains a private attorney
to prosecute a criminal case. See, e.g., John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality
of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511 (1994); Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution
of Crime in the Nineteenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43 (1995); Joan Meier, The
“Right” to a Disinterested Prosecutor of Criminal Contempt: Unpacking Public and Private Interests,
70 WASH. U. L.Q. 85 (1992).
4. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 666-68. One’s position on privatization may be dictated more
by ideology than by theoretical or empirical considerations. See Gold, supra note 3, at 359-60. Yet,
privatization of prosecutors’ offices would seem to implicate issues of fundamental equality in a way
that privatization of utilities, or even prisons, would not. See sources cited infra notes 5-6.
5. JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 17 (1980).
6. Standen, supra note 1, at 270.
7. For a discussion of efficiency and other benefits of privatization, see Solomon, supra note 2,
at 1214-15.
8. This Note focuses primarily on the public interest impact of private financing rather than on
whether it is ethical for prosecutors to accept private contributions, or on private financing’s possible
constitutional implications. Yet these issues overlap considerably. Rules of prosecutorial ethics
uniformly recognize that prosecutors have a duty to act in the public interest. See, e.g., MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1998) (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister
of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”). This duty has constitutional underpinnings. See Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); John D. Bessler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality
of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 514 (1994) (employing a public interest analysis in
evaluating the constitutionality of private prosecutions). Furthermore, courts sometimes draw on
professional ethics norms in considering what behavior the constitution requires of prosecutors. See,
e.g., Young v. United States ex. rel Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814-15 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). Justice Blackmun argued that the constitution requires a prosecutor to be “disinterested,”
i.e. free from conflicts of interest. Id.
9. This Note does not consider the impact of a privately financed prosecution on the fairness of
a defendant’s trial, or explore a defendant’s possible remedies for a prosecutor’s financially motivated
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/10
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Part II of this Note sets forth hypotheticals illustrating four private
financing models and summarizes the history of these models. Part III
describes the prosecutor’s discretionary role in allocating criminal justice
resources, as well as the legal standards requiring that prosecutors exercise
that discretion in a disinterested manner. Part III also briefly describes how
private interests currently influence the exercise of prosecutorial discretion,
and suggests that prosecutors have inherent authority to define the public
interest by balancing the competing demands of many private constituencies.
Part IV examines two cases that have addressed private financing schemes
and analyzes these cases through the framework set forth in Part III. Finally,
Part V proposes structural modifications to existing private financing models
that would enable private financing to advance egalitarian values while
preserving public control over the prosecution function.
II. FOUR MODELS OF PRIVATE FINANCING
Private financing of a criminal prosecution occurs when a person acting in
her private capacity contributes money to a public prosecuting entity. The
following hypotheticals illustrate four possible forms of private financing.
Hypotheticals A and B depict models in which private contributors target
their contributions to specific cases, while C and D depict financing models
aimed at broad classes of cases.10
overzealousness. It seems doubtful that constitutional or other proscriptions against overzealousness
would protect a defendant in a privately financed prosecution more than a defendant in a publicly
financed prosecution. Cf. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1980) (rejecting defendant’s
argument that statute authorizing prosecuting entity to keep penalty sums collected from defendant
created an impermissible risk that entity would assess unduly large and numerous penalties). But cf.
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 707 (“Preferential access to justice for monied interests also threatens the
defendant’s distinct interest in equality . . . . Arguably, no defendant has a right to a fiscally strapped
prosecutor, but the prospect of defendants facing disproportionate prosecution by the government
based on the wealth of their accusers is troubling.”). Rather, this Note focuses primarily on the issue of
whether private financing of prosecutors’ offices undermines fairness in the allocation of criminal
justice resources among victims and defendants.
Victims probably do not have a justiciable interest in equitable allocation of prosecutorial
resources. See Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (“[I]n American jurisprudence at
least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.”). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989)
(indicating in dictum that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a state from denying law enforcement
services to disfavored groups). The Equal Protection Clause bars “selective prosecution” of a
defendant based on certain improper criteria. See infra note 23. A defendant claiming selective
prosecution, however, must present considerable evidence of nefarious prosecutorial intent. This Note
does not address the application of these constitutional principles to private financing systems. Rather,
this Note considers equal allocation of criminal justice resources from a public policy standpoint. 
10. There are at least two models of private financing that this Note will not specifically analyze.
One model entails private parties funding all or part of a prosecutor’s general office expenses rather
than restricting their contributions to expenses associated with a particular crime or class of crimes.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Hypothetical A— The Case-Specific/Non-Victim Model: A news
reporter interviews a prosecutor about a female suspect who allegedly
drowned her two young sons and later publicly accused an unidentified
African American male of kidnapping them. The prosecutor tells the reporter
that the state might not have enough money to prosecute the woman. In
response to the news report, several citizens send the prosecutor’s office
personal checks, some of them payable on the condition that the prosecutor
seek the death penalty.11
Hypothetical B— The Case-Specific/Victim Model: After a bitter
dispute with management, an employee of a technology company, PicoTech,
Inc., resigns and accepts a position with PicoTech’s competitor, ChipCo.
Shortly thereafter, PicoTech management notices that its ex-employee e-
mailed several computer files from PicoTech to ChipCo shortly before
resigning. PicoTech informs the police and the local prosecutor that it
believes it has been the victim of trade secret theft. Neither the police nor the
prosecutor’s investigators, however, possess the technical expertise necessary
to search ChipCo’s computer files for PicoTech’s trade secrets. At the behest
of the prosecutor, PicoTech pays for the cost of an expert investigation of
ChipCo’s computer files. PicoTech also reimburses the prosecutor for the
cost of transcribing prosecution witnesses’ taped testimony.12
Hypothetical C— The Blind Trust Fund Model: County Chief
Prosecutor Jones learns that the county plans to cut her office budget this
year for the fourth consecutive year. Last year, the state legislature enacted a
statute specifically criminalizing workers’ compensation fraud. Jones would
like to test the new statute by prosecuting a few workers’ compensation
cases. Her deflated budget, however, and the high expert witness fees
associated with workers’ compensation cases would force Jones to set aside
three street crime prosecutions for every workers’ compensation case she
undertook. Therefore, after obtaining approval from the state attorney
general, Jones establishes a workers’ compensation fraud trust fund and
publicly invites contributions. The fund generates over $150,000 in
The dearth of reported instances suggests that such contributions occur infrequently, and in any event
would seem to make an informed analysis of this model difficult. The other model involves a “bounty”
system in which a prosecutor collects financial penalties from offenders. The Supreme Court has
upheld the use of this model. See Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238 (upholding a statute permitting a prosecuting
entity to collect a portion of penalties imposed on violators to offset prosecution costs).
11. Hypothetical A is based on the well-publicized Susan Smith case. See Jim Clarke, Smith Held
Without Bail in Deaths of Her Sons Crime: She is Jeered by Angry Townspeople Outside South
Carolina Courthouse. “You’re a baby murderer!” One Woman Shouts, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994, at
A-22, available in 1994 WL 2362910; Al Dozier, Judge: Use of Private Funds OK, THE HERALD
(Rock Hill, S.C.), Jan. 26, 1995, at 4A, available in 1995 WL 8692385.
12. Hypothetical B is based on the facts of People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/10
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contributions. The contributors’ identities are not disclosed to the public or
the prosecutor’s office.13 Later, Jones establishes a second blind trust fund to
finance prosecutions of environmental violations.14
Hypothetical D— The Industry Assessment Model: Four years ago, the
State of Mortimer enacted a statute specifically criminalizing insurance
fraud. The senator who authored the statute announced that the statute was
intended to encourage local prosecutors to prosecute more insurance fraud
cases. Yet, most of Mortimer’s district attorneys have virtually ignored the
statute, claiming that their offices do not have enough money to crack down
on insurance crime. The Mortimer State Legislature responds by levying an
assessment against all of the state’s insurance companies. The assessment
proceeds fund an insurance fraud investigative agency and an insurance fraud
unit within the state attorney general’s office.15 As the number of insurance
fraud prosecutions increases, insurance fraud decreases, Mortimer insurance
companies’ profit margins increase, and insurance premiums decrease.
Hypotheticals A and B illustrate case-specific private financing. In case-
specific/non-victim private financing, depicted in hypothetical A, the
prosecutor receives money to fund a particular criminal case from persons
with no relation to the victim or other direct interest in the case beyond their
interest as citizens. At least one trial court has approved a prosecutor’s use of
non-victim case-specific contributions,16 and at least one has refused to do
so.17 In case-specific/victim private financing, depicted in hypothetical B, the
13. Hypothetical C is loosely based on media reports of a 1992 initiative of the Ventura County,
California District Attorney. See Gary Gorman, D.A. Sets Up Fund For Workers’ Fraud Cases Law
Enforcement: Businesses Will Be Asked to Contribute the Money Needed for Prosecutions. Some
Critics Fear that the Office’s Efforts Could Favor the Donors, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1993, Metro Part-
B, at 1, available in 1993 WL 2357419; Jeff McDonald, D.A. to Be Honored for Fraud Program, L.A.
TIMES, July 17, 1993, Metro Part-B, at 3, available in 1993 WL 2293386; Jeff McDonald, Schools
Help Fight Workers’ Comp Fraud Crime: Public Education, Farmers and Others Donate $155,000 to
the District Attorney’s Fund to Crack Down on Fraudulent Claimants, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 1993,
Metro Part-B, at 1, available in 1993 WL 2311683 [hereinafter McDonald, Workers’ Comp Fraud].
14. See Tina Daunt, Fish and Game Code Violators Targeted, L.A. TIMES, July 21, 1993, Metro
Part-B, at 3, available in 1993 WL 2292299 (discussing a trust established by the Ventura County
District Attorney to prosecute fish and wildlife violations).
15. Several states have enacted similar insurance industry assessment legislation. See ARK. CODE
ANN. § 23-100-104 (Michie 1997); CAL. INS. CODE § 1872.83 (West 1998); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 3701-303 (1998).
16. The judge in the Susan Smith case allowed the prosecutor’s office to keep private
contributions. See Al Dozier, Judge: Use of Private Funds OK, THE HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), Jan.
26, 1995, at 4A.
17. In Memphis, a special prosecutor received over $300,000 from “[s]ome 350 organizations,
churchgoers, business people and concerned citizens” to fund the special prosecutor’s efforts to close
down the city’s topless clubs. See Lawrence Buser, Private Giving Tops $300,000 in War on Topless
Clubs, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 15, 1997, at A1, available in 1997 WL 11970536.
Later, a judge disqualified the special prosecutor and the district attorney’s office, and dismissed seven
Washington University Open Scholarship
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victim of an alleged crime funds part of the prosecution of the crime.18 In a
landmark decision, the California Supreme Court held that a trial court did
not abuse its discretion in disqualifying an entire district attorney’s office that
had solicited and accepted such a contribution.19
Hypotheticals C and D depict models of private financing targeting
general classes of crimes rather than particular cases. Hypothetical C,
illustrating the blind trust fund model, depicts a chief prosecutor’s initiative
in establishing a formal system of private financing. The blind trust generates
revenue to prosecute a given type of case while minimizing the possibility of
favoritism to particular donors by withholding the donors’ names from the
prosecutor. In the industry assessment model, illustrated by hypothetical D, a
legislature similarly attempts to generate revenue to use for prosecuting
certain crimes while minimizing private influence on prosecutors’ decisions.
The industry assessment model requires businesses in a given industry to
contribute fixed amounts for the prosecution of crimes which affect that
industry. The mandatory nature of the contributions prevents the industry
from exercising influence on prosecutorial decisions by threatening to
withdraw financial support. Several state legislatures finance insurance fraud
prosecutions through the general assessment model.20 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts recently upheld that state’s industry assessment
legislation.21
III. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND IMPARTIALITY
Opponents of the use of private funds in criminal prosecutions argue that
private contributions will unduly influence prosecutors to exercise their
broad discretion to favor those who contribute.22 An understanding of the
policies implicated by private financing therefore requires an appreciation of
indictments because he found them “tainted” by the private contributions. See Lawrence Buser, State
to File Appeal in Topless Case Dismissals, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Apr. 24, 1998, at B2,
available in 1998 WL 11202164.
18. This scenario closely parallels the historic practice of private prosecution, in which a private
party files and hires an attorney to prosecute a criminal complaint. See supra note 3. Ordinarily,
private financing raises at least one troubling possibility that private prosecution does not raise: the
possibility that private interests will marshall the government’s formidable investigative resources on
its behalf. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 666 n.3. In a criminal case involving complex technical
issues, however, private financing arguably would not create this possibility because many law
enforcement agencies lack personnel with sufficient technical expertise to serve as formidable forces
in such cases.
19. See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 323 (Cal. 1996).
20. See supra note 15.
21. See Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999).
22. See generally Kennedy, supra note 3.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/10
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the scope of prosecutorial discretion and of existing standards of
prosecutorial impartiality.
A. Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Enforcement
The American criminal justice system relies on selectivity in
enforcement,23 and grants to an array of government officials the
discretionary authority to administer the selection process.24 In particular, the
system vests prosecutors with considerable discretion in determining which
cases and which defendants to prosecute.25 Courts rarely review a
prosecutor’s affirmative charging decision,26 and will almost never second-
23. ABA standards provide that “[t]he prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the
evidence might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause consistent with
the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that sufficient evidence may exist which
would support a conviction.” 1 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE ch. 3 § 3.9(b) (2d ed. 1980).
The Supreme Court deemed conscious selectivity in enforcement constitutional in Oyler v. Boles, so
long as the selection was not “deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion,
or other arbitrary classification.” 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962). A defendant who has been singled out for
prosecution on the basis of an impermissible criterion may bring a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause for “selective prosecution.” See, e.g., Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985); Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). But in United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996), the Supreme
Court imposed an exacting standard of discovery of government documents such that proof of
selective prosecution may now be virtually impossible. See generally Marc Michael, Note, United
States v. Armstrong: Selective Prosecution— A Futile Defense and Its Arduous Standard of Discovery,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 675 (1998).
24. For detailed discussions of the justifications for discretion generally and prosecutorial
discretion in particular, see KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY
(1969) and Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L.
532 (1970).
25. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978). See generally James Vorenberg,
Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521 (1981). Broad prosecutorial
discretion in charging decisions has significant consequences to the defendant as well as to society. As
Professor Vorenburg observes:
The decision whether or not to charge affects a prospective defendant in three ways. First, it
determines whether he must undergo the expense, anxiety, and embarrassment of criminal
proceedings. Second, in those cases in which clear evidence of guilt exists or can be obtained by
whatever resources and effort the prosecutor wishes to invest, the decision to charge determines
whether or not there will be a conviction. Third, depending on the scope of judicial discretion in
sentencing and, to a lesser extent, on the degree to which dispensing power is held by parole or
corrections authorities, the charge decision may have a major effect on the penalty.
Id. at 1525. See also Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et. Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 814 (1987)
(“Even if a defendant is ultimately acquitted, forced immersion in criminal investigation and
adjudication is a wrenching disruption of everyday life.”).
The prosecutor, moreover, exercises considerable discretion in areas other than charging,
including plea bargaining. See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364-65; Donald B. Gifford,
Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion, 1983 U. ILL. L.
REV. 37, 38.
26. Courts will review prosecutors’ decisions to file a charge only if the defendant makes a prima
facie showing that the prosecution violates the Constitution because it is discriminatory, see, e.g.,
Washington University Open Scholarship
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guess the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute.27
Commentators have offered several policy-based rationales for selective
enforcement, including the desirability of tailoring justice to the defendant’s
individual circumstances28 and, as a corollary, legislative
overcriminalization.29 At bottom, however, selective enforcement exists
because full enforcement would be impossible given law enforcement
agencies’ limited resources and the finite capacities of courts and prisons.30
Prosecutors and other discretionary actors within the criminal justice system
must allocate the system’s resources among many meritorious cases.31 In
exercising their discretion, prosecutors must, and clearly possess authority to,
balance the public’s fiscal interests against the public’s enforcement needs.32
Illustratively, the charging decision standards promulgated by the National
District Attorneys Association provide that a prosecutor may consider the
“likely cost of the prosecution in relation to the seriousness of the offense.”33
United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974), or because it is “vindictive” in retaliating
against the defendant’s exercise of a constitutional right, see, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 27
(1973).
27. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619
(1973); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 376-77 (2d Cir. 1973).
28. See Carl F. Pinkele, Discretion Fits Democracy: An Advocate’s Argument, in DISCRETION,
JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 3, 11 (Carl F. Pinkele & William C.
Louthan eds., 1985) (“Justice blind to the human facts of a case runs a very great risk of being blind
justice. Or, as Dickens suggests in Oliver Twist, the law has the very great potential of being “an
ass.”).
29. See, e.g., Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1971); Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality—
Institutions of Amelioration, 67 VA. L. REV. 177, 216 (1981) (“Given the extreme irrationality that has
characterized [sentencing] grading in most American jurisdictions, and the failure to repeal . . . many
crimes when community mores have shifted radically, the idea that prosecutors should not look
beyond the grade fixed by legislatures cannot seriously be urged.”).
30. Cf. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (noting that “the States and the Federal
Government would need to multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities” if the
government resolved every serious criminal charge through a full trial).
31. See, e.g., FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 159 (1969); William C. Louthan, The Politics of Discretionary Justice Among Criminal Justice
Agencies, in DISCRETION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 13, 17 (Carl F.
Pickele & William C. Louthan eds., 1st ed. 1985) (“[I]f every violation of the law were prosecuted, the
cost would be beyond measure.”); Vorenberg, supra note 25, at 1525.
32. But see State ex rel. Ginsberg v. Naum, 318 S.E.2d 454 (W.Va. 1984). In Ginsberg, the
Supreme Court of West Virginia held that a prosecutor may not decline to prosecute for lack of funds.
Id. at 456.
33. NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASS’N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, Standard
9.3 (1977). The complete list of factors provided by the National District Attorneys Association
follows:
1. The nature of the offense;
2. The characteristics of the offender;
3. The age of the offense;
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol77/iss4/10
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The prosecutor’s exercise of discretion in making a particular charging
decision might, therefore, be defined as the authority to balance the societal
benefits of pursuing a particular case against the probable costs of doing so.
More generally, the prosecutor’s discretion encompasses the policy-making
authority to distribute finite resources according to her assessment of the
public interest.34
B. Discretion and Private Influence
Private financial influences on prosecutorial discretion need not be
corrupting.35 The dubious temptation of institutional gain created by private
financing would probably not induce most prosecutors to consciously
disregard their public duty.36 But private financing may disserve the public
interest even if it does not create a significant risk of deliberate improper
behavior.
Answering the policy question raised by private financing requires a
complicated balancing of conflicting interests. On one hand, the public
4. The interests of the victim;
5. Possible improper motives of a victim or witness;
6. A history of non-enforcement of a statute;
7. Likelihood of prosecution by another criminal justice authority;
9. Aid to other prosecuting goals through non-prosecution;
10. Possible deterrent value of prosecution;
11. Undue hardship caused to the accused;
12. Excessive cost of prosecution in relation to the seriousness of the offense;
13. The probability of conviction;
14. Recommendations of the involved law enforcement agency; and
15. Any mitigating circumstances.
Id. (factor 8 omitted in original). The American Bar Association’s list of permissible considerations in
charging does not expressly authorize a prosecutor to consider the likely cost of pursuing charges. See
ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION, Standard 3-3.9(b) (1992). This list, however, sets forth only a few sample considerations,
and does not purport to be exclusive. Id. Probably no one has attempted to establish an exhaustive list
of factors that a prosecutor may properly consider in making charging decisions. For a discussion of
factors and evidentiary standards applicable to the charging decision, see generally MILLER, supra
note 31.
34. See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 98 (1971)
(noting that the prosecutor serves as the primary “gatekeeper” for the entire criminal justice system,
and that “the effects of his work reverberate through every component of the system”); Standen, supra
note 1, at 259-60 (“[G]iven the substantial control prosecutors now enjoy over the assignment of
prison space, the remaining question . . . is whether we ought to continue to have various ‘middlemen’
between the prosecutor and distribution of prison space.”).
35. Indeed, such influences may be corrective.  See generally Meares, supra note 3 (proposing a
system of private financial incentives to influence prosecutors not to engage in misconduct).  
36. Cf. Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 62 (1972) (White, J., dissenting).
Washington University Open Scholarship
p1369+rd+Abramov.doc 03/22/00   9:31 AM
1352 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:1343
clearly benefits to the extent that private financing reduces the burden on the
public treasury. On the other hand, the policy analysis must take account of
public interests that probably cannot be measured in monetary terms. Courts
and commentators have recognized, for example, a public interest in ensuring
that government officials exercise their duties in an impartial, or
“disinterested,” manner.37
This Part evaluates the scope of the public’s interest in prosecutorial
impartiality among meritorious cases at the charging stage. Specifically, this
Part explores where the ethical boundaries of private financial influence on
prosecutorial discretion have been, and should be, drawn. This analysis
attempts to take into account the realities of the prosecutor’s political and
institutional environment.
1. The “Disinterested Prosecutor” Requirement
Although several Supreme Court decisions proscribe government agents
from participating in proceedings in which they have a financial interest,38 no
single standard of disinterest applies across-the-board to all public officials.39
Judges, for example, are subject to a more stringent standard of neutrality
than are prosecutors.40 In Tumey v. Ohio,41 the Supreme Court struck down
on due process grounds a state law that, in effect, allowed judges to preside
over trials in which they had a clear personal stake.42 Later, in Ward v.
37. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 667 (“Private financing raises the question of whether taking
voluntary contributions from victims or other private groups creates a conflict of interest— a conflict
between the prosecutor’s obligation to be impartial in making these choices and the prosecutor’s
institutional interest in the monies received.”); Warren L. Ratliff, The Due Process Failure of
America’s Prison Privatization Statutes, 21 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 371, 384-86 (1997) (“[A] series of
Court precedents . . . amply demonstrate that financial disinterestedness is a universally-accepted, if
sometimes implicit, principle of due process.”).
38. See, e.g., Connally v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977); Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 578-
79 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485-86 (1972).
39. See Ratliff, supra note 37, at 386.
40. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § 3E (1990) (“A judge shall disqualify
himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”).
ABA rules impose no similar standard of disqualification upon prosecutors. 
41. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
42. See id. at 523.  The statutory scheme at issue in Tumey created a “mayor’s court” in which
the mayor of the municipality presided over prohibition trials.  The mayor had the power to assess
fines and keep a portion of sums collected.  See id. at 520.  Moreover, the mayor received no
compensation for his services as judge except out of the fines collected from defendants.  Id.  In
striking down this statutory scheme, the Court expressly recognized the distinction between the
standard of disinterestedness applicable to judges and that applicable to prosecutors.  Id. at 535.  The
Court stressed that legislatures “may, and often ought to, stimulate prosecutions for crime by offering
to those who shall initiate and carry on such prosecutions rewards for thus acting in the interest of the
State and the people.”  Id.          
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Village of Monroeville,43 the Court extended Tumey, striking down a
statutory scheme that gave judges a more indirect, institutional stake in
proceedings over which they presided.44 Furthermore, in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Lavoie,45 the Court explained that due process “may
sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do
their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending
parties.”46
In Marshall v. Jerrico,47 however, the Court unanimously upheld a
statutory private financing scheme that gave a prosecuting entity an
institutional incentive to enforce the law zealously. The Court noted that
“[p]rosecutors need not be ‘entirely neutral and detached’” and that “[t]he
rigid requirements of Tumey and Ward” do not apply to prosecutors.48 The
statute in Jerrico allowed an administrative agency, which the Court deemed
analogous to a prosecutor, to keep a portion of the penalty sums collected
from child labor law violators.49 One might argue that “bounty” statutes such
as the one upheld in Jerrico do not raise the equality issues that victim-
funded criminal prosecutions implicate. Nonetheless, the Jerrico decision
recognized that the Constitution does not bar prosecutors from participating
in every case in which their institutions have a clear financial interest.50
The Court adopted a “disinterested prosecutor” requirement in Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils, S.A.51 In exercising its supervisory
43. 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
44. The Court in Ward invalidated another mayoral court scheme, but in Ward, unlike in Tumey,
the mayor-judge had no direct financial interest in the outcome of the cases over which he presided.
See id. at 62 (White, J., dissenting).  Rather, the Court invalidated the scheme because the mayor’s
fiscal responsibilities as the primary executive officer for the municipality might tempt him to impose
higher fines in order to enhance the city’s treasury.  See id. at 60.  The Court cited Tumey and asserted
that “[t]his, too, is a ‘situation in which an official perforce occupies two practically and seriously
inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial.”  Id. (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. 510, 534).
45. 475 U.S. 813.
46. Id. at 825 (citing In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)).
47. 446 U.S. 238 (1980).
48. Id. at 248 (quoting Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 49 U.S. 57, 62 (1972)).
49. Id. at 239.
50. Moreover, the statute upheld in Jerrico raises the same allocative equality concerns that a
victim-funded prosecution system would implicate.  The prospect of financial rewards accruing to a
prosecuting entity could encourage the entity’s personnel to engage in “rent-seeking” by prosecuting
an ever-increasing number of arguable or de minimis violations, thereby continuously expanding the
entity’s activity.  Cf. Standen, supra note 1, at 262-69.  One prosecuting agency’s aggressive
expansion would likely divert public resources from enforcement efforts in substantive areas that fall
outside of the agency’s jurisdiction.  Even if collected “bounties” funded all prosecution costs, cases
appealed from the expanding agency would consume an increasing proportion of court time, diverting
judicial resources from other uses.   
51. 481 U.S. 787, 807 (1987).  The Court has long recognized, however, that the prosecutor’s
duty to act in the public interest includes a duty to apply the law evenhandedly.  As the Court stated in
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), “[t]he [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary
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power to disapprove private prosecutions of criminal contempt,52 the Court
stated that “a scheme injecting a personal interest, financial or otherwise, into
the enforcement process may bring irrelevant or impermissible factors into
the prosecutorial decision.”53 Although Young is susceptible to broader
interpretations,54 the “disinterested prosecutor” requirement may merely bar
private prosecutions.55 First, the Court in Young cited Jerrico with approval
and emphasized that the rigid standards of disinterest designed for judges do
not apply to prosecutors.56 Secondly, several lower courts have indicated that
Young applies only to private “interested” prosecutions.57 Finally, the Young
Court repeatedly emphasized that the private prosecution created an “actual”
conflict of interest between the private prosecutor’s ethical obligations to his
private client and the public interest.58 The private prosecutor’s duty to
zealously represent the interests of the private client was clearly important to
the Court.59 While the dictum in Young is broad, that case involved a much
clearer conflict of interest than that which most private financing schemes
would create.
In summary, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that the more stringent
proscriptions against judicial bias do not apply to prosecutors. Moreover, the
Court upheld a statutory scheme providing for private financing of criminal
prosecutions in Jerrico and has never required that prosecutors be free from
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as
its obligation to govern at all.”  Id. at 88.
52. See Young, 481 U.S. at 806.  For discussions of the doubts that the Young opinion casts on
the permissibility of private prosecutions generally, see Bessler, supra note 3; Meier, supra note 3, at
100-07. 
53. Young, 481 U.S. at 808 (quoting Jerrico, 446 U.S. 238, 249-50).
54. See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 320 (“[A] prosecutor ‘is not disinterested if he has, or
is under the influence of others who have, an axe to grind against the defendant.’”) (emphasis in the
original) (quoting Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1056 (2d Cir. 1984)).
55. See Meier, supra note 3, at 96 (“[A]lthough the Court [in Young] framed the issue as one of
‘interested’ versus ‘disinterested’ prosecutors, the distinction is more properly between ‘private’
versus ‘public’ prosecutors.  This is apparent . . . from the language of the decision itself, from its
reliance on Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., and from subsequent decisions construing Young.”).
56. See Meier, supra note 3, at 96 (“The [Young] Court’s reliance on Jerrico demonstrates that
the Court actually eschewed prosecution by private parties rather than by ‘interested’ ones.”)
(emphasis in original).
57. See id. at 97 (citing FTC v. American Nat’l Cellular, 868 F.2d 315 (9th Cir. 1989); Rollins v.
State, 748 P.2d 767, 770 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); State v. Britt, 377 S.E.2d 79, 82 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989)).
58. Young, 481 U.S. at 807.  The Court emphasized that “[i]n a case where a prosecutor
represents an interested party . . . the ethics of the legal profession require that an interest other than
the Government’s be taken into account.”  Id.  (emphasis in original).  See also Meier, supra note 3, at
97.
59. See Young, 481 U.S. at 804 (“The concern that representation of other clients may
compromise the prosecutor’s pursuit of the Government’s interest rests on recognition that a
prosecutor would owe an ethical duty to those other clients.”).
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the institutional biases that a private financing system might create.
2. The Presumption of Regularity in Prosecutorial Policy-Making
 The prosecutor’s responsibility to serve the interests of “the public” in
effect requires that the prosecutor consider private interests, because “the
public” consists of private individuals and factions with competing desires
and preferences.60 Furthermore, the prosecutor’s institutional needs create
considerable pressure to serve the private interests of two constituencies in
particular— crime victims and police.61 A “disinterested prosecutor”
requirement that prohibited even severe institutional conflicts of interest
would seem wholly impractical unless the requirement permits consideration
of countervailing justifications for the conflicts. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Town of Newton v. Rumery62 reveals
considerable deference to prosecutorial decisions made in the face of such
conflicts. A majority of the Court in Rumery rejected a § 1983 plaintiff’s
public policy challenge to a “release-dismissal” agreement in which the
plaintiff released his civil claims against, among others, the victim and the
police, in exchange for the prosecutor’s dismissal of criminal charges
pending against him.63 Justice Powell, joined by three other justices,
suggested that the prosecutor’s dismissal decision was consistent with public
policy64 because the prosecutor could have concluded that protecting public
60. Cf. FTC v. American Nat’l Cellular, 868 F.2d 315, 319 (1989).
61. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.1 (1986).  Professor Wolfram
indicates that, although police, victims, judges, and other government officials cannot properly be
regarded as the prosecutor’s “clients,” each of these constituencies exercises some influence on the
prosecutor’s decisions.  See id.  In elaborating on prosecutorial conflicts of interest, Professor Wolfram
observes that conflicts can arise from the prosecutor-police relationship because the “relationship is
typified by unity of purpose, a sense of a real and dangerous common enemy, and an emotional
commitment to the full exploitation of legal resources to bring criminals to bay.”  See id. at § 8.9.2. 
See also MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS 224 (1990) (“The prosecutor’s
job can be extremely onerous if he does not have the willing cooperation of the police. . . . As a
consequence, the prosecutor can be under considerable pressure to ignore or to cover up police
misconduct.”).
62. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
63. After being charged with witness tampering, Rumery, a businessman, engaged an
experienced criminal defense attorney.  See id. at 390. The defense attorney warned the prosecutor that
the state “had better [dismiss] these charges, because we’re going to win them and after that we’re
going to sue.”  Id.  Rumery and the prosecutor subsequently entered into an agreement in which
Rumery released any claims he might have against the town, its officials, and the victim in exchange
for dismissal of the criminal charges.  See id. at 390-91.  Rumery subsequently filed a § 1983 action,
alleging that “the town and its officers had violated his civil rights by arresting him, defaming him, and
imprisoning him falsely.”  Id. at 391.  A majority of the Court upheld the agreement because the
evidence showed that Rumery had entered into it voluntarily, and because the prosecutor had been
motivated in part by the desire to spare the victim from testifying.  See id. at 397-98.   
64. The Court in Rumery examined the policy justifications for the prosecutor’s decision not to
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officials from the expense of defending against frivolous civil rights claims
served the public interest.65  Specifically, the plurality approved the
prosecutor’s decision because defending against “meritless” suits “require[s]
the time and attention of the defendant officials, to the detriment of their
public duties.”66 Justice Powell cited no evidence that the plaintiff’s suit
actually lacked merit, or even that the prosecutor thought that it lacked merit.
The Powell plurality thus applied a strong presumption that the prosecutor’s
decision was guided solely by considerations of justice and the public interest
even though the prosecutor had a clear institutional conflict of interest.67
On the other hand, this approach has not been adopted by a majority of
the Court. Another four-justice plurality in Rumery declared that “[t]he
public is entitled to have the prosecutor’s decision to go forward with a
criminal case . . . made independently of his concerns about the potential
pursue a case only because this decision was embodied in the contract— the release-dismissal
agreement— that the plaintiff challenged on policy grounds.  Courts ordinarily refuse to review
prosecutors’ non-enforcement decisions.  See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. The
overwhelming majority of instances in which prosecutors dismiss or fail to bring charges are therefore
never subject to judicial or public scrutiny.  See Vorenburg, supra note 25, at 1559.
65. The parties stipulated that one factor in the prosecutor’s decision to enter the release
dismissal-agreement centered around protecting the victim and key witness from the “trauma she
would suffer if she were forced to testify.”  Rumery, 480 U.S. at 390.  A majority of the Court deemed
this factor an “independent, legitimate reason” to uphold the agreement, id. at 398, and left open the
question of whether a release-dismissal agreement could be valid absent such an independent
justification.  See id. at 398 n.10 (“We have no occasion in this case to determine whether an inquiry
into voluntariness alone is sufficient to determine the enforceability of release-dismissal agreements.”).
66. Id. at 395-96 (Opinion of Powell, J.).  Justice O’Connor, who cast the swing vote, seemed to
reject this expansive conception of the public interest.  In her view, “[t]he central problem with the
release-dismissal agreement is that public criminal justice interests are explicitly traded against the
private financial interest of the [public officials] involved in the arrest and prosecution.”  Id. at 401
(O’Connor, J., concurring).  Similarly, Justice Stevens argued in his dissenting opinion that a release-
dismissal agreement creates “an obvious potential conflict between the prosecutor’s duty to enforce the
law and his objective of protecting members of the Police Department who are accused of unlawful
conduct.”  See id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).   
67. Justice Powell noted that a “mere opportunity to act improperly” does not permit courts to
assume that a prosecutor will engage in misconduct.  See id. at 397 (Opinion of Powell, J.).  See also
Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 832
(1999) (“Simply because prosecutors can abuse their authority does not mean that they must be
abusing it.”).
In effect, Justice Powell seemed to adopt a “rational relation” test in reviewing the prosecutor’s
judgment as to whether the private interests at stake coincided with the public interest.  Justice
O’Connor indicated in her concurring opinion that she would review this prosecutorial policy
judgment more strictly, expressing the view that the party seeking to rely on a release-dismissal
agreement to bar a civil claim has the burden to prove that the agreement was voluntary and in the
public interest.  See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The defendants in a § 1983
suit may establish that a particular release executed in exchange for the dismissal of criminal charges
was voluntarily made, . . . and in the public interest.  But they must prove that this is so; the courts
should not presume it.”) (emphasis in original).
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damages liability of the police department.”68 In addition, as suggested
above, one might interpret the Court’s opinion in Young to suggest that any
tendency on the part of a prosecutor to favor a private interest inherently
jeopardizes the public interest.69
As already noted, however, Young may have little bearing on whether
public prosecutors should take private interests into account when making
discretionary decisions. Young did not involve review of a public
prosecutor’s exercise of discretion. Rather, the Court in Young considered the
permissibility of a private prosecution. Private prosecutors cannot exercise
the full range of prosecutorial discretion because, like other privately retained
attorneys, they have a duty to zealously represent the interests of their private
clients.70 A private prosecutor cannot conduct the prosecution in the manner
she deems most consistent with the public interest if doing so would
jeopardize the legitimate objectives of the private party she represents.71
Young seems to require nothing more than that the prosecutor reserve the
discretion necessary to act in the manner that she believes will best advance
the public interest.72 Young does not require that a prosecutor form that belief
in an environment hermetically sealed against private influences.
In light of the limited judicial review of prosecutorial decisions, it is clear
that the prosecutor has significant unchecked power to consider a variety of
private influences when exercising her discretion.73 The important issue
would seem to be whether society does, or should, recognize that the
authority to consider private interests inheres in the prosecutor’s policy-
making role.74 Recognition of such authority would realistically acknowledge
that the prosecutor must balance the competing interests of many private
68. See id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
69. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1981) (“A Lawyer
Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law”).
71. See Young, 481 U.S. at 814 (noting that the private prosecutor’s duties required him to “serve
two masters”); cf. WOLFRAM, supra note 61, § 13.10 n.35 (deeming private prosecutors a “barbaric
exception” to the generalization that the prosecutor is an officer with several important constituencies
but no client).  For example, a private prosecutor may not dismiss a case that he considers contrary to
the public interest if the prosecution serves the legitimate interests of his private client.
72. The Court observed that:
Ordinarily we can only speculate whether . . . interests [extraneous to the public interest] are likely
to influence an enforcement officer. . . . In a case where a prosecutor represents an interested
party, however, the ethics of the legal profession require that an interest other than the
Government’s be taken into account.  Given this inherent conflict in roles, there is no need to
speculate whether the prosecutor will be subject to extraneous influence.
Young, 481 U.S. at 807 (emphasis in original). 
73. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
74. See WOLFRAM, supra note 61, § 8.9.2 (noting that a prosecutor’s role includes the policy-
making duty of deciding how to expend public resources).
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constituencies in exercising her discretion. Regardless of whether society
recognizes this authority, however, a prosecutorial environment devoid of
clamorous private influences is not a viable option.75 In making this point,
this Note certainly does not suggest that prosecutorial discretion is already so
adulterated with private influences that society might as well allow it to
become even more adulterated. This Note suggests only that society tolerates
some private influences on prosecutors because important societal needs
justify doing so. As Part V of this Note argues, important societal needs also
justify toleration of private financing schemes.
IV. JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO VICTIM-FUNDED PROSECUTIONS
Two states’ highest courts have directly considered whether prosecutors
may accept institutional contributions from crime victims. Both courts
evaluated the financing scheme through a prosecutorial disinterest
framework. Though the two courts reached different results, both courts paid
particular attention to how the financing schemes at issue would appear to the
public.76 The focus on public perception led one court to prohibit prosecutors
from receiving case-specific contributions from victims, and the other court
to uphold a legislatively enacted industry assessment model.
A. Case-Specific/Victim Private Financing— People v. Eubanks
People v. Eubanks,77 on which Hypothetical B78 is based, provides a
notorious example of the potential evils of case-specific/victim private
financing.79 In Eubanks, the alleged victim, a technology company, funded
75. See Meares, supra note 3, at 852 (noting that the entire criminal justice system is governed
by perverse incentives).
76. For a discussion of ethical standards linked to “appearances,” see Kevin McMunigal,
Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823, 840-42 (1992).
77. 927 P.2d 310 (Cal. 1996). For a detailed discussion of Eubanks, see Kelly C. Quinn,
Criminal Law, California Supreme Court Survey, April 1996-July 1997, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 183, 256
(1997).
78. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 3, at 707; Arlene Levinson, Businesses Asked to Pay for
White-Collar Crime-Fighting, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 1, 1994, available in 1994 WL
10122355. Eubanks’ notoriety seems due in part to the probable ulterior motives of the victim, a
competitor of the defendant’s company. The victim-company may have decided to fund the
prosecution in an attempt to harass its competitor out of business. See Robert A. Spanner, On the Take,
THE RECORDER (American Lawyer Media, L.P.) July 29, 1998, at 5 (“Every high-tech corporation . . .
knows that the prosecution of an irksome competitor for technology misappropriation will usually
eliminate that company as a competitive factor.”). Moreover, the victim-company might have thought
that the criminal prosecution, whether or not it ultimately resulted in a conviction, would help the
company prevail in a related civil action. See Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 324 (George, C.J., concurring). The
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part of the trade secret theft prosecution of its competitor’s principal.80
Interpreting a state statute restricting the grounds upon which a court may
disqualify a prosecutor for a conflict of interest,81 the California Supreme
Court upheld the trial court’s decision to disqualify the entire prosecuting
office.82 The court reviewed the trial court’s decision only for abuse of
discretion,83 and did not state whether the trial court would have abused its
discretion if it had not disqualified the prosecutor.84
In sweeping language that belied the narrowness of its holding, however,
the court asserted that “[a] system in which affluent victims . . . were assured
of prompt attention from the district attorney’s office, while crimes against
the poor went unprosecuted, would neither deserve nor receive the
confidence of the public. Even the appearance of such impropriety would be
highly destructive of the public trust.”85 The court went on to categorically
reject the prosecutor’s arguments that no conflict existed because the
alleged victim in Eubanks had filed such a parallel lawsuit. See id. Eubanks therefore illustrates more
than a wealthy victim’s simple desire for vengeance; it suggests that a prosecutor’s office can be
commandeered for private ends wholly unrelated to the public administration of justice. As the
concurring justice in Eubanks pointed out, “the district attorney could ‘reimburse’ [the complaining
company] for paying the [prosecution costs] simply by exercising discretion to continue or extend the
criminal investigation for longer than it otherwise would.” See id.
80. See Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 313.
81. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1424(a)(1) (West Supp. 1997). The statute provides: “The motion [to
disqualify a district attorney] may not be granted unless the evidence shows that a conflict of interest
exists that would render it unlikely that the defendant would receive a fair trial.” Id. The court
interpreted this limitation to mean that a finding of a conflict of interest could not be based solely on
the possibility that the prosecutor’s further involvement would “appear unseemly.” See Eubanks, 927
P.2d at 317. The court held, however, that the statute’s proscription on prosecutorial conflicts of
interest “contemplates both ‘actual’ and ‘apparent’ conflict when the presence of either renders it
unlikely that a defendant would receive a fair trial.” Id. (quoting People v. Conner, 666 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal.
1983)). For a discussion of ethical standards relating to prosecutorial conflicts of interest, see Richard
H. Underwood, Part-Time Prosecutors and Conflicts of Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81
KY. L.J. 1, 16-23 (1993). Cf. Roberta K. Flowers, What You See is What You Get: Applying the
Appearance of Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 734-39 (1998) (proposing
that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct should incorporate an “appearances of impropriety”
standard to govern all aspects of the prosecutor’s official conduct).
82. See Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 323.
83. See id.
84. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice George argued that the facts underlying Eubanks
required recusal as a matter of law. See id. at 323 (George, C.J., concurring).
85. See id. at 318. In a footnote to this text, the court acknowledged that it did not believe that
such a system existed in the district attorney’s office, nor elsewhere in the state. See id. at 318 n.5. In
fact, the court noted that “large corporations often have difficulty interesting local prosecutors, whose
resources are already strained by the fight against violent crime, in the investigation and prosecution of
business fraud and other complicated crimes against corporate victims.” See id. (quoting I.B.M. Corp.
v. Brown, 857 F. Supp. 1384, 1388-89 (C.D. Cal. 1994)). The court, then, based its decision in part on
the need to eliminate even the appearance that the prosecutor favored wealthy corporate interests.
Ethical standards that base liability on the appearance of impropriety have been sharply criticized. See,
e.g., WOLFRAM, supra note 61, § 7.1.4.
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prosecutor had only an institutional interest in the contributions,86 and that
accepting private contributions amounts to a proper prosecutorial response to
revenue shortages.87 The Eubanks court’s rationale extends much farther than
the case’s troubling facts,88 as at least one trial court in another state has
applied Eubanks in disapproving case-specific contributions by non-
victims.89 Eubanks thus seems to cast at least some doubt on courts’ future
willingness to tolerate any form of private financing.90 The Eubanks court
did, however, expressly reserve the question of whether industry-funded
private financing schemes create an intolerable conflict of interest.91
B. Industry Assessment Financing— Commonwealth v. Ellis
In Commonwealth v. Ellis,92 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
rejected the defendants’ state and federal constitutional challenges to
industry-assessment legislation similar to that depicted in Hypothetical D.93
The statute levied assessments against two voluntary associations of
insurance carriers and directed the attorney general to use the proceeds to
investigate and prosecute insurance fraud.94 Specifically, the statute required
the attorney general to designate a specified number of full-time assistants to
investigate and prosecute insurance and workers’ compensation fraud.95 The
statute further authorized the two insurance associations to create and finance
an insurance fraud bureau that would investigate and refer suspected
instances of insurance fraud to law enforcement authorities.96 Moreover, the
insurance fraud bureau and the attorney general’s office developed a “special
public/private partnership” in which the bureau worked closely with the
attorney general’s staff and occasionally reimbursed miscellaneous expenses
that the attorney general incurred in insurance fraud prosecutions.97
86. See Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 310, 318-19.
87. See id. at 319-20.
88. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
89. A Tennessee trial judge cited Eubanks in dismissing obscenity charges against topless club
owners, concluding that private contributions in excess of $300,000 had “tainted” the prosecution. See
Lawrence Buser, State to File Appeal in Topless Case Dismissals, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.),
Apr. 24, 1998, at B2, available in 1997 WL 11970536.
90. See Spanner, supra note 79 (“[T]o be against Eubanks is to be for the compromised
impartiality of public servants; . . . indeed, standing against Eubanks can be characterized as a stand
for the selling of justice.”).
91. See Eubanks, 927 P.2d at 321.
92. 708 N.E.2d 644 (Mass. 1999).
93. See discussion of Hypothetical D, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
94. See Ellis, 708 N.E.2d at 646.
95. See id.
96. See id. at 645.
97. See id. at 652-53. These reimbursed expenses included witnesses’ travel expenses, computer
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The Ellis court assumed that the Constitution guaranteed an “impartial
prosecutor” and concluded that the statute at issue enabled prosecutors to be
impartial.98 In rejecting the defendants’ argument that the statute gave
insurance carriers control over the system, the court emphasized that the
statute left the decision of whether to prosecute to the prosecutors.99 The
court found the fraud bureau’s voluntary reimbursement of prosecution
expenses “more problematic,” but deemed this assistance too “minimal” to
amount to a constitutional violation.100 That the legislature had approved the
private financing scheme seemed to go far in persuading the Ellis court of its
constitutionality.101 The court acknowledged that “statutory endorsement of
an unconstitutional plan cannot make it constitutional,” but went on to
suggest that the constitutional issue turned on the public appearance of the
financing system, and concluded that legislative control over the scheme
“substantially changes appearances.”102
The results in Ellis and Eubanks seem correct, but the courts relied on
questionable reasoning. Both courts employed analytical frameworks that
emphasized procedural fairness to the individual defendants.103 To the extent
equipment, and expert witness fees. See id. at 653 n.24.
98. Id. at 650. The court concluded that the Massachussetts Constitution does guarantee a right to
a disinterested prosecutor “in the sense that the prosecutor must not be nor appear to be influenced . . .
either by his or her personal interests or by a person or entity to whom the prosecution of a criminal
case will or may bring significant benefits.” Id. Thus, in upholding the industry assessment legislation,
the court not only held that the legislation did not “influence” prosecutors, but also that it did not even
create an appearance of influence. Clearly, the court adopted a restrictive definition of “influence.”
The legislation obviously appears to influence, and indeed to require, prosecutors to devote more
attention to insurance fraud cases in the aggregate. Perhaps the court meant that a prosecutor’s
personal interests must not make her more likely to prosecute any individual insurance fraud suspect in
lieu of another.
99. See id. at 650-52. The court first rejected the argument that because participation in the rating
associations that funded the prosecutions was voluntary, the insurance companies could exercise
control over the prosecutor if they threatened to cut off funding by withdrawing from the associations.
See id. at 651. The court reasoned that any such threat would be “an obvious paper tiger” because the
legislature could amend the statute to assess the insurance carriers based on the number of premiums
written or on some other objective criterion. Id. Secondly, the court asserted that the statute did not
operate to benefit insurance companies. See id. at 651-52. In support of this proposition, the court
reasoned that insurance companies would have to credit any amounts they collected in restitution
against their reported losses at rate filing, and that “the Legislature . . . devise[d] this plan . . . to face a
serious problem of false [insurance claims] that inflate insurance premiums for insurance buyers.” Id.
at 652.
100. Id. at 653.
101. See id. at 652. The court stated that “[i]f we were confronted with a challenge to an
arrangement between insurers and the Attorney General of the sort involved here that was not
endorsed by statute, the appearance of the possibility of improper influence would have been far
clearer.” Id.
102. Id.
103. Professor Sklansky points out that the framework focusing only on fairness to individual
defendants predominates within criminal procedure generally. See Sklansky, supra note 3, at 1280-81
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that the courts focused on the public, they asked only whether the public
would perceive the financing scheme as fair— not whether the scheme would
actually result in unfair allocation of resources among the public.104 Because
a defendant has no cognizable right to an underfunded prosecution,105 a
framework that focuses only on the defendant’s rights would not seem to go
far enough in safeguarding public control of the prosecution function.106
Courts may, however, be reluctant to delve too deeply into a financing
scheme’s tangible effect on the public due to a belief that the legislative and
executive branches should resolve such issues.107
Yet, if the political branches are better qualified to decide how to allocate
public resources, the Eubanks and Ellis courts’ focus on “appearances”
would seem misdirected. Assuming that a financing scheme is sufficiently
visible to enable the public to form a negative view of the scheme, the
political process would seem to provide an adequate avenue through which
to express that view.108 If the judiciary’s role is to safeguard the integrity of
the political process, courts should ask only whether the private financing
scheme is visible to the public eye, and not whether the public will like what
it sees. Legislative endorsement improves a private financing scheme
because it preserves visibility and public control, not because it makes people
feel better about the government.109 Instead of addressing private financing
(“[C]riminal procedure has been overwhelmingly focused on issues of fairness writ small: the
procedural obligations owed by the state to an individual suspected of crime . . . not with questions of
distributional justice.”).
104. Moreover, courts’ concerns about the public perception of the criminal justice system’s
fairness often surface in their attempts to rationalize heightened procedural protections for defendants.
See, e.g., Joint Anti-Facist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (noting that the criminal justice system’s procedural safeguards help preserve the system’s
apparent fairness).
105. See Wright v. United States, 732 F.2d 1048, 1057 (2d Cir. 1984).
106. For example, appellate review of a privately financed conviction focusing only on a
defendant’s rights would seem to provide insufficient protection if the court applied harmless error
analysis. Cf. Young, 481 U.S. 787, 811-12 (1987) (plurality opinion) (arguing that harmless error
analysis should not apply to violations of the right to a disinterested prosecutor because “[a] concern
for actual prejudice . . . misses the point, for what is at stake is the public perception of the integrity of
our criminal justice system”).
107. See Sklansky, supra note 3, at 1281-83.
108. See Carl F. Pinkele, Discretion Fits Democracy: An Advocate’s Argument, in DISCRETION,
JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY 3, 11 (Carl F. Pinkele & William C. Louthan eds., 1985) (“Is politics
enough of a check? It is not only enough, but in a democratic mold it is the legitimate one.”). Pinkele
sets forth several factors that indicate whether the democratic process serves as an effective check on a
discretionary actor’s decisions. See id. at 3. These include the actor’s accessibility, responsiveness, and
acceptance of public responsibility for fiduciary decisions. See id.
109. Several commentators have, however, noted the legitimating force of democracy. See, e.g.,
James D. Wright, Political Disaffection, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 12-13 (Samuel
L. Long ed., 1981) (noting that democracy “help[s] members to accept or tolerate outputs to which
they are opposed”).
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through the framework of an appearance-oriented individual right, courts
should acknowledge that the “right” they are protecting belongs to the
public.110 A court should exercise its inherent authority to disqualify a
prosecutor who accepts contributions randomly or secretly, or in some other
manner that the public could not control through the political process.111
Otherwise, in the absence of cognizable harm to the defendant, courts should
defer to the policy choices of politically accountable officials.
V. TAILORING PRIVATE FINANCING TO PROMOTE ALLOCATIVE FAIRNESS
Private financing would probably not significantly increase the total
number of prosecutions and incarcerations, thereby contributing to the
government’s tendency to enforce societal norms through harsh and
repressive means. The criminal justice system has a finite capacity, so every
privately financed prosecution would to some degree displace other
prosecutions and alter the existing allocation of criminal justice resources.112
Some such change would seem desirable; the fact that prosecutors must
consider costs in making charging decisions suggests that the current
allocation of resources does not optimally coincide with society’s values and
needs.113
One reason for the noted under-enforcement of white-collar crimes114
110. This Note does not suggest that private financing never unfairly harms defendants. This Note
suggests only that courts should not redress harm that is solely public in the guise of protecting a
private right.
111. For example, the plurality in Young invoked its supervisory power to reverse the conviction.
Young, 481 U.S. at 809 n.21.
112. Even if prosecutors’ salaries and expenses were funded entirely by private interests, a total
increase in prosecutions would require greater court capacity and perhaps more public defender
resources. See Kennedy, supra note 3, at 699-700 (“Private financing of criminal prosecutions will not
. . . increase the total capacity of the criminal justice system; it will merely change the mix of cases
prosecuted. . . . Each privately financed criminal case would displace a publicly financed prosecution
to some extent.”).
113. See id. at 676 n.36 (“Clearly the fact that prosecutors are forced to consider the cost of a
prosecution under the current regime is the single most compelling argument for considering the use of
private financing. In an ideal world, the prosecutor would be free to select crimes based solely on
[non-fiscal] factors.”).
114. See I.B.M. Corp. v. Brown, 857 F. Supp. 1384 (C.D. Cal. 1994). The court noted:
[I]t is . . . virtually impossible for large corporate victims to secure prosecution of crimes
committed against them, especially if they are unwilling or unable to make a significant
contribution to the criminal investigation at their own expense. The result has been that crimes
against large corporations may be committed with criminal impunity.
Id. at 1388. See generally Michael L. Benson et al., Community Context and the Prosecution of
Corporate Crime, in WHITE COLLAR CRIME RECONSIDERED 269 (Kip Schlegel & David Weisburd
eds., 1992). Moreover, white collar crimes such as insurance fraud exact heavy costs on society. See
Ruth Gastel, Insurance Fraud, 3 INS. ISSUES UPDATE (Insurance Information Institute), Aug. 1998.
Translated into dollars, the fraudulent portion of [auto insurance claims] amounted to 17 to 20
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may be that prosecutors must invest more resources to prevail in white-collar
cases than in other cases.115 A myriad of other political and institutional
factors might also lead to the under-enforcement of such crimes.116 For
example, a prosecutor might decline to bring meritorious white-collar crime
cases because she believes that she can more easily “win” cases against
indigent defendants in street crime cases.117 A private financing scheme
would seem to advance egalitarian values if it tended to correct under-
cents of every payment dollar. This adds up to $6.3 billion every year to the nation’s auto
insurance policy-holders bills . . . The nation’s bill for health care fraud is enormous— as large as
$95 billion.
Id. See also I.B.M. Corp, 857 F. Supp. 1384, 1388 (“[The] virtual lack of criminal exposure for white
collar crime against large corporations may be partly responsible for a dramatic increase in business
crimes over recent years. The effects . . . may be such ills as higher prices and loss of jobs.”). Not only
does insurance fraud raise policyholders’ premiums, see id., but insurance fraud and other white-collar
crimes may impose costs directly on taxpayers. See, e.g., Rebekah Young, Cheap Tricks: Employers
Without Workers Comp Insurance, WASH. MONTHLY, Sept. 1998, at 34, available in 1998 WL
14398565. Furthermore, overt non-enforcement of white-collar crimes may greatly undermine public
morale. See Gastel, supra. Some individuals rationalize their own acts of fraud on the grounds that
“everyone is doing it,” while those who do not engage in fraud may come to feel that they are being
taxed for their honesty. See id. (“Two thirds of the poll’s respondents thought that fraud was justified
because insurance premiums increase. . . . Sixty percent . . . think that people who commit fraud are
looking for a fair return on the premiums they have paid. . . . In addition, 27 percent think that nobody
tells the truth on insurance fraud applications.”).
Many political and institutional factors other than financial cost probably contribute to under-
enforcement of white-collar crimes.
115. See Meares, supra note 3, at 877-79.
116. An example of such a factor is the prosecutor’s institutional need to maximize conviction
rates. See, e.g., George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 119
(1975); Sidney I. Lezak & Maureen Leonard, The Prosecutor’s Discretion: Out of the Closet, Not Out
of Control, in DISCRETION, JUSTICE, AND DEMOCRACY: A PUBLIC POLICY PERSPECTIVE 44, 46 (Carl
F. Pickele & William C. Louthan eds., 1st ed. 1985); MILLER, supra note 31, at 22. See also Marc D.
Goodman, Why the Police Don’t Care About Computer Crime, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 465, 478-82
(1997) (explaining that the excitement-oriented, “machismo” culture of law enforcement leads
officials to ignore technology crimes); Meares, supra note 3, at 853-54 (explaining that lack of
institutional and ethical constraints on prosecutors leads prosecutors to engage in misconduct and to
overcharge in order to undermine defendants’ bargaining power in plea negotiations); Arlene
Levinson, Businesses Asked to Pay for White-Collar Crime-Fighting, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 1,
1994, available in 1994 WL 10122355. One prosecutor spoke of being laughed at when he asked city
hall for money to fight crimes such as consumer fraud and municipal corruption. See id.
117. See Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19
UCLA L. REV. 1, 12 (1971) (“The fact that [white-collar] violators . . . often [have] status in the
community creates special enforcement difficulties and poses controversial questions regarding the use
of traditional penal sanctions.”); Meares, supra note 3, at 877-79 (explaining that indigent defendants
may be in an inferior bargaining position relative to non-indigent defendants). Cf. Richard H.
McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 605, 651 n.141 (1998) (“[I]magine that a prosecutor accepts lower pleas or even drops certain
charges against defendants who hire private attorneys. Targeting the poor in this way could increase
the prosecutorial win rate. Public defenders generally have less experience and less time to spend on a
given case.”).
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enforcement118 without overcompensating or surrendering public control.119
Accordingly, the following discussion proposes how private financing
models might be structured to conform to these criteria.
A. Case-Specific Models
As this Note has previously suggested, the electoral process inadequately
safeguards the public interest in the case-specific financing context.120
Further, as Eubanks demonstrates, permitting case-specific contributions
from victims would create a significant risk that the prosecution function
could be directed toward ends that have nothing whatsoever to do with the
public interest, such as harassment of a competitor.121 State legislatures
should statutorily prohibit case-specific contributions. A legislature that does
not enact such a prohibition should enact a requirement that a prosecutor to
whom a private party offers a contribution should either reject the
contribution or immediately disclose it to the court.
B. The Blind Trust Model
For a blind trust model to preserve public control, prosecutors must
adhere to strict disclosure requirements. The prosecutor creating the trust
should announce the existence of the trust to the media and publish a
pamphlet describing in detail how the policy will operate.122 Only a
prosecutor who is directly accountable to an electorate, such as a district
attorney or a state attorney general, should create such a trust. A government
official independent from the prosecutor’s office should administer the trust.
Moreover, because the key advantage to the “blindness” of the trust,
preventing favoritism to donors vis-a-vis non-donors,123 obviously disappears
upon public disclosure of donors’ names, a prosecutor should not create a
blind trust system if the state’s public records statute would require
disclosure of donors’ names.124
118. Cf. Meares, supra note 3, at 857 (noting that a system of financial rewards designed to
encourage prosecutors to act properly could provide prosecutors with a “correcting bias” in favor of
advancing justice).
119. See Standen, supra note 1, at 269-70.
120. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
121. See supra note 79.
122. To some degree, the nature of the blind trust model helps to ensure public disclosure, because
a prosecutor must announce the existence of the trust to potential contributors.
123. Clearly, if a prosecutor does not know who contributed to the fund she cannot favor the
contributors. See Barbara Murphy, Countywide Fraud Unit Reaches Fund-Raising Goal, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 1993, at 2, available in 1993 WL 2330250.
124. Cf. McDonald, Workers’ Comp Fraud, supra note 13. McDonald sets forth a list naming the
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A prosecutor structuring a blind trust to advance allocative equality values
should build in safeguards to account for the fact that donors could stop
contributing. A prosecutor’s salary or working conditions should not depend
upon money generated by such a fund.125 Ideally, private contributions
should finance no fixed costs, but only the variable costs that arguably
contribute to under-enforcement of certain crimes, such as expert witness
fees and initial expert investigations.126 Such structural constraints would
advance allocative equality by helping to put cases involving insurance fraud,
technology offenses, and other under-enforced crimes on equal financial
footing with other cases127 while ensuring that prosecutors do not allocate an
excessive proportion of public resources to industry out of fear of losing their
jobs.128 Moreover, such constraints would minimize the possibility that
prosecutors will allocate an unduly large proportion of criminal justice
resources to industry in seeking “rents” from industry such as raises,
professional advancement, or better working conditions.129
C. The Industry Assessment Model
Legislative enactment potentially enhances visibility and facilitates public
control over private financing schemes, but does not alone resolve the
equality issues that private financing implicates. If revenue generated through
largest donors to the Ventura County workman’s compensation fraud fund, a list that the L.A. times
acquired by filing a request pursuant to the California Public Records Act. See id.
125. Cf. Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 245 (1987) (upholding a scheme authorizing a
prosecuting agency to keep monetary penalties in part because no official’s salary was affected by the
amount of penalties collected); Carol Bidwell, Businesses Donate $150,000 To Battle Work-Injury
Fraud, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 8, 1993, at SV4, available in 1993 WL 3516763.
126. Sometimes the initial investigation costs associated with determining whether a white-collar
crime has been committed are so prohibitively high that a prosecutor never becomes able to evaluate
the evidentiary strength of a case or the overall public interest value of prosecution. As the court in
IBM Corp. v. Brown noted, “[b]usiness frauds often involve very complex schemes. As a result, very
large expenditures of funds and resources are often necessary before a bona-fide suspicion of fraud can
be affirmed.” 857 F. Supp. 1384, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Some prosecuting offices have addressed this
problem by asking corporate victims to conduct the investigations themselves, or to contribute their
experts to determine whether a crime has been committed. See Spanner, supra note 79, at 5.
127. See Dennis Jay, Playing Fair on Insurance Fraud, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 3, 1998, at D4,
available in 1998 WL 9120677.
128. As Joseph Kennedy notes:
An institution that depends on voluntary contributions to pay the salary of any of its personnel is
dependent upon those contributions in an important way, given that most bureaucracies struggle to
avoid having to eliminate positions . . . [and] a prosecutor whose salary is paid out of business
contributions to a fund for a certain category of white collar crimes might fear that her salary
would not be forthcoming for the next fiscal year if her prosecutorial decisions did not satisfy her
contributors.
Kennedy, supra note 3, at 695.
129. For a discussion of prosecutorial rent-seeking, see Standen, supra note 1, at 261-67.
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this model pays prosecutors’ salaries, the assessments should occur on an
involuntary basis in order to eliminate the prosecutor’s perception that she
might lose her job if her performance does not satisfy the industry.130
Additional safeguards would also seem desirable; a prosecutor might make
allocative choices with an eye toward pleasing industry if she worried that
the industry might lobby the legislature to repeal or amend the statute
providing funding for her salary.131 It would seem difficult to fully safeguard
against such possibilities. Ideally, therefore, industry assessment legislation
should not fund salaries.
If revenues from assessments are used to finance the fixed costs of
maintaining insurance fraud units within prosecuting offices, prosecutors and
legislatures should make every effort to ensure that working conditions for
prosecutors within the insurance fraud units are the same as those for
prosecutors in other units.132 A financing scheme would greatly undermine
equality if it encouraged the most experienced prosecutors to work in
insurance fraud units by offering particularly attractive employment
perquisites. Furthermore, to ensure visibility of all contributions and to
prevent prosecutors from kowtowing to industry in order to obtain more
institutional contributions, a legislature should prohibit industry from
contributing more than the statute specifically allows.
IV. CONCLUSION
Private financing has the potential to further public values by providing a
corrective offset of fiscal and other institutional influences on prosecutorial
130. The Massachusetts legislation seems problematic in this respect, because it assesses only
members of voluntary associations of insurance companies. A prosecutor whose salary depended on
the continuation of industry funding might favor the insurance industry too much out of fear that the
industry would withdraw funding by dissolving the associations. But see Commonwealth v. Ellis, 708
N.E.2d 644, 651 (Mass. 1999) (deeming any possible threat of withdrawal an “obvious paper tiger”
because the legislature could amend the statute to base assessments on a different criterion). Industry
assessment statutes typically assess companies based on the amount of business they transact within
the state. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-100-104 (Michie 1999); CAL. INS. CODE § 1872.85 (West
1999); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701-303 (1999).
131. A Pennsylvania industry assessment statute, in an apparent attempt to address such problems,
provides that:
No funding reduction . . . can be imposed . . . which would operate to reduce funding for any
multiyear approved program for which persons have been hired for full-time positions to a
funding level where such positions must be terminated, unless the organization . . . certifies either
that other equivalent positions are available or that such positions . . . can be funded from other
sources.
40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3701-303(f) (1998).
132. See Ellis, 708 N.E.2d at 652 (emphasizing that the prosecutors in the insurance fraud unit
“are treated no differently from others in the Attorney General’s office”).
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discretion that lead to inequitable allocation of criminal justice resources.
Canceling out such influences would enable prosecutors to make charging
decisions on a financially-level playing field and enhance the prosecutor’s
freedom to pursue the cases and offenders most deserving of prosecution.
The blind trust and industry assessment models provide two workable
frameworks for private financing. These models, however, must be carefully
structured so as to avoid overcompensating for institutional influences
leading to under-enforcement and to preserve public control over the
prosecution function.
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